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Abstract
Evolutionary models for populations of constant size are frequently studied using the Moran
model, theWright–Fisher model, or their diffusion limits. When evolution is neutral, a random
genealogy given through Kingman’s coalescent is used in order to understand basic properties
of such models. Here, we address the use of a genealogical perspective for models with weak
frequency-dependent selection, i.e. Ns =: α is small, where s is the fitness advantage of
a fit individual and N is the population size. When computing fixation probabilities, this
leads either to the approach proposed by Rousset (2003), who argues how to use Kingman’s
coalescent in order to study weak selection, or to extensions of the ancestral selection graph
of Neuhauser and Krone (1997) and Neuhauser (1999). As an application of this genealogical
approach, we re-derive the one-third rule of evolutionary game theory (Nowak et al., 2004). In
addition, we provide the approximate distribution of the genealogical distance of two randomly
sampled individuals under linear frequency-dependence.
1 Introduction
Evolutionary game theory has long been studied using replicator equations and deterministic
systems by using an infinite population limit (Taylor and Jonker, 1978; Maynard-Smith, 1982;
Nowak, 2006). Recently, the amount of research dealing with repeated games in finite populations
increases. In the simplest case, a population of N players (each carrying one out of a possible
set of strategies) repeatedly chooses an opponent at random and plays a game with payoff matrix
M . In addition, players can produce offspring and the fitness of an individual with strategy A is
determined by the average payoff the player obtains in the evolutionary game. Since the average
payoff depends on the frequencies of the strategies in the population, the fitness is frequency-
dependent, and the frequency path is e.g. given by a Moran model or a Wright–Fisher model with
frequency-dependent selection.
When studying models for populations of individuals carrying different types (or adopting
different strategies), several questions are most important (see e.g. Ewens, 2004). What is the
probability of fixation of a type (in absence of mutation), or what is the random distribution of
types in mutation-selection balance? If fixation occurs, what is the distribution of the fixation
time? When taking a sample from the population, what is its genealogical structure? In addition,
extensions to structured populations or to the multi-type case are considered. For the questions
on fixation probabilities and times, the theory of birth-death processes and (one-dimensional)
diffusions is frequently used (Karlin and Taylor, 1981). Here, explicit formulas are available for
such quantities, but these can hardly be extended to multi-dimensional cases. Another approach
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Keywords and phrases. Evolutionary game theory, weak selection, ancestral selection graph
1
2 MODELS 2
is the use of the genealogical structure by coalescent processes (Kingman, 1982; Berestycki, 2009).
The advantage is that it is extensible to populations in structured or multi-type populations. In
addition, questions on the genealogical structure can be asked. As an example from evolutionary
game theory, Gokhale and Traulsen (2011) study the frequency path of many-player many-strategy
games using such a genealogical approach.
The current paper was motivated by the one-third rule of evolutionary game theory (Nowak et al.,
2004). It states that in finite populations of players with two strategies A and B, strategy A is
favored in the sense that the fixation probability of type A in a B-population is higher than under
neutrality if and only if type A is favored in the infinite population limit at frequency 1/3. Since
the one-third rule was found in a Moran model, it has as well been proven to hold in a Wright–
Fisher model (Traulsen et al., 2006; Imhof and Nowak, 2006) and in general exchangeable models
(Lessard and Ladret, 2007). An intuitive explanation was given in Ohtsuki et al. (2007), who ar-
gue that an individual interacts on average with B-players twice as often as with A-players, which
implies the one-third rule. Wu et al. (2010) discuss violations of the one-third rule for non-linear
frequency dependence.
The goal of the present paper is to use a genealogical approach in the study of fixation prob-
abilities. Only Ladret and Lessard (2007), who use a method developed by Rousset (2003), al-
ready take this route; see also Rousset (2004), p. 92f. We complement their approach by us-
ing the Ancestral Selection Graph (ASG), first introduced in the frequency-independent case
by Neuhauser and Krone (1997) and Krone and Neuhauser (1997). This graph extends the coa-
lescent to the selective case and has been further extended to a simple frequency-dependent case
in Neuhauser (1999). In addition, we study genealogical distances in models from evolutionary
game theory, i.e. frequency-dependent selection.
The paper is organized as follows: After stating the models (and their diffusion limits), we
re-formulate the one-third rule and our results on genealogical distances. Then, we provide two
proofs of the one-third rule. Finally our genealogical result is proved.
2 Models
We are studying the solution X = (Xt)t≥0 of the stochastic differential equation
dX = ((1−X)θA −XθB)dt+ αX(1−X)(β − γX)dt+
√
X(1−X)dW (2.1)
for α, θA, θB ≥ 0, β, γ ∈ R. Here, α is called the scaled selection coefficient, and θA and θB the
scaled mutation rates, and X gives the frequency path of type (or strategy) A in a population of
constant size. For this diffusion, we define in the case θA = θB = 0
T1 := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt = 1}
and note that T1 < ∞ if and only if type-A eventually fixes in the population. In our analysis,
the version of (2.1) without mutation and without fluctuations,
dx = αx(1 − x)(β − γx)dt (2.2)
will also play a role.
2.1 A finite Moran model
We are turning to the frequency path of strategy (or type) A in a time-continuous Moran model
of size N , which converges to X as N →∞. We distinguish four cases, corresponding to the signs
of β and γ. Setting x∗ = β/γ (which is an equilibrium point in (2.2)), the four cases are:
(i) β > 0 and γ > 0, which leads to a stable fixed point in x∗ for (2.2) (if x∗ ∈ (0, 1)),
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(ii) β < 0 and γ < 0, which leads to an unstable fixed point in x∗ for (2.2) (if x∗ ∈ (0, 1)),
(iii) β > 0 and γ < 0, which leads x = 1 as the only stable fixed point in (2.2),
(iv) β < 0 and γ > 0, which leads x = 0 as the only stable fixed point in (2.2).
In case (ii) and (iv), strategyA cannot invade a population consisting only of strategyB individuals
in (2.2) and vice versa.
The time-continuous Moran model is a Markov process with state space {A,B}N (indicating
the types of N individuals) and the following transition rules:
1. Every pair of individuals i and j resamples at rate 1. Upon a resampling event, the offspring
of i (or j) replaces j (or i) with probability 12 .
2A. In cases (i) and (iii), i.e. when β > 0, the offspring of any A-individual replaces a randomly
chosen individual at rate αβ.
2B. In cases (ii) and (iv), i.e. when β < 0, the offspring of any B-individual replaces a randomly
chosen individual at rate −αβ = α|β|.
3A. In cases (i) and (iv), i.e. when γ > 0, every B-individual picks a randomly chosen individual
at rate αγ. If it is an A-individual, an offspring of the B-individual replaces another,
randomly chosen individual.
3B. In cases (ii) and (iii), i.e. when γ < 0, every A-individual picks a randomly chosen individual
at rate −αγ = α|γ|. If it is another A-individual, an offspring of the first A-individual
replaces another, randomly chosen individual.
4. Every individual is hit by a mutation event at rate θ¯ := θA + θB. With probability θA/θ¯,
the individual turns into type A, and with probability θB/θ¯, it turns to B, independent of
the type of the parent.
In the graphical construction of the Moran model, the transitions 1.–3. are given by arrows denoted
T1-T3, respectively. The T3-arrows are in fact double-arrows since the type of one individual has
to be checked (along the line which we will call the checking line; see also Neuhauser (1999)) while
the second arrow leads to reproduction (which will be called the imitating line). See Figures 1
and 2 for illustrations of the transitions 1., 2. and 3. By now, it is a classical result that the
frequency path of the Moran model converges weakly (with respect to the topology of uniform
convergence on compact sets) to solutions of (2.1); see e.g. Ethier and Kurtz (1993).
2.2 Connection with evolutionary games
Consider a game with payoff matrix
A B
A a b
B c d
There are N players, each one adopting either strategy (or type) A or B. If the frequencies of
type A and type B are XA and XB, respectively, the fitnesses are dependent on the payoff matrix
and are given by
fA :=
1
2 + s(aXA + bXB) =
1
2 + s(b+ (a− b)XA),
fB :=
1
2 + s(cXA + dXB) =
1
2 + s(d+ (c− d)XA).
(2.3)
Note that aXA+ bXB is the average payoff of a type-A individual when playing against a random
player from the population.
Here, the offspring of every individual of type A replaces a randomly chosen individual at rate
fA. Accordingly, a type-B offspring replaces a randomly chosen individual at rate fB (given that
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Figure 1: Three different kinds of events occur in the Moran model which has limit (2.1). (1) For
every (ordered) pair of individuals i and j, a T1-arrow occurs at rate 12 . Here, the offspring of
i replaces individual j (independent of the types of i and j). (2) T2-arrows are the first of two
selective arrows. In cases (i) and (iii) (cases (ii) and (iv)), they occur at rate αβ (at rate −αβ).
Upon such an event, the offspring of individual i replaces j, given that i has type A (type B).
(3) T3-(double-)arrows, occur in case (i) and (iv) (cases (ii) and (iii)) at rate αγ (at rate −αγ).
Here, the imitating arrow is created from i to j, as well as the checking arrow from i to k. Given i
has type B (type A) the checked individual k has type A (in both cases), individual j is replaced
by an offspring of individual i.
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Figure 2: The graphical representation of the Moran model (without mutation). Here, every pair
of individuals is connected by a T1-arrow at rate 1, every individual is the origin of a T2-arrow at
rate α|β|, and every individual is origin of a T3-double-arrow to one checking and one imitating
line at rate α|γ|. Types/strategies are inherited along the arrows according to the rules 1.–3.
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s is small enough such that the rates are non-negative). The frequency path of type-A, follows in
the infinite-population limit, N →∞,
dx = sx(1 − x)(b + (a− b)x− d− (c− d)x)dt = sx(1 − x)(β − γx)dt
with
β := b− d, γ := b− d+ c− a. (2.4)
Moreover, when N → ∞, s → 0 such that Ns → α, and time is rescaled by a factor of N ,
the frequency path of type-A follows the SDE as given in (2.1). Since the Moran model from
Section 2.1 has the same diffusion limit, we use its graphical representation in order to obtain
insights into the evolutionary game just described.
3 Results
Starting by re-formulating the one-third rule in Section 3.1, we give our result on the distribution
of genealogical distances in the Moran model from Section 2.1 in Section 3.2.
3.1 The one-third rule
We are now ready to formulate the one-third rule. For θA = θB = 0, we define
pfix(ε, α) := P(T1 <∞|X0 = ε),
which is the fixation probability of type A if it starts in frequency ε and selection intensity is
α. Note that pfix(ε, 0) = ε, i.e. the chance that strategy A fixes equals its starting frequency, if
evolution is neutral.
Theorem 1 (One-third rule, Nowak et al. (2004)). Let X = (Xt)t≥0 be the solution of (2.1) with
θA = θB = 0. Then,
lim
α→0
1
αε
(
pfix(ε, α)− ε
) ε→0
−−−→ β − γ
1
3
.
In particular, pfix(ε, α) > pfix(ε, 0) for α, ε small enough, if and only if
β − γ
1
3
> 0,
i.e. the fitness of type A is above average at frequency x = 13 .
In Section 5, we will provide two different proofs of this result. The first proof goes back
to Ladret and Lessard (2007), the second one uses the ancestral selection graph which we in-
troduce in Section 4.
3.2 Genealogical distances
In order to precisely formulate our results on genealogical distances, we are considering the Moran
model from Section 2.1 including mutation, i.e. θA, θB > 0. Assume that the Moran model
(which evolves according to the rules 1.–4.) has run for an infinite amount of time. Then, every
pair of individuals has a most recent common ancestor which can be read off from the graphical
representation; see Figure 2.
Here, we denote by PN,α the distribution of the Moran model with population size N and
selection coefficient α in equilibrium, and by EN,α the corresponding expectation. Note that the
Moran model is finite and hence, the equilibrium exists and is unique. Moreover, we denote by R12
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the genealogical distance of two randomly sampled individuals from the equilibrium population.
In the case α = 0, recall that the distance of two randomly sampled individuals is exponentially
distributed, and hence, EN,α=0[e
−λR12 ]
N→∞
−−−−→ 1/(1+λ). The following result generalizes this fact
to small α, i.e. weak selection.
Theorem 2 (Genealogical distances under weak frequency-dependent selection).
Let EN,α and R12 be as above. Then, with θ¯ = θA + θB,
lim
N→∞
EN,α[e
−λR12 ] =
1
1 + λ
− αγ
θAθB
θ¯
(2 + θ¯ + λ)λ
(6 + θ¯ + λ)(3 + θ¯ + λ)(1 + θ¯ + λ)(1 + θ¯)(1 + λ)2
+O(α2).
In particular,
lim
N→∞
EN,α[R12] = 1 + αγ
θAθB
θ¯
2 + θ¯
(6 + θ¯)(3 + θ¯)(1 + θ¯)2
+O(α2)
Remark 3.1. 1. Note that – up to first order in α – the change in the genealogical distance
only depends on γ but not on β. This is not surprising since it has been shown that in the
case of frequency-independent selection, β = 1, γ = 0, the change in the genealogical distance
is of order α2; see Theorem 4.26 in Krone and Neuhauser (1997). However, this leads to an
interesting effect: assume that β > γ > 0. Then, type A is selectively advantageous at any
time during the evolution of the population. So, one might guess that type-A individuals have
a higher chance to get offspring and genealogical distances are shorter than under neutrality.
However, as the result shows, up to first order in α, genealogical distances are larger than
under neutrality. The reason is that for γ > 0, selection is strongest by frequent interactions
between A and B individuals, and such interactions require a high heterozygosity, which in
turn requires larger genealogical distance.
2. In our proof, we implicitly take advantage of the recently developed theory of tree-valued
stochastic processes from Greven et al. (2012) and Depperschmidt et al. (2012). The idea is
to describe the evolution of the genealogical distance of two randomly sampled points. If no
events hit the two lines, the distance grows at constant speed. If a T1-arrow falls in between
the two sampled individuals, their distance is reset to 0. Finally, with high probability, the
two sampled lines are hit by T2- or T3-arrows only if the arrows originate from one of the
N − 2 other individuals. Once the evolution of the distance of two randomly sampled lines
is given, we only have to find a(n approximate) fixed point in order to show Theorem 2. The
details are given in Section 6.
4 The ASG for linear frequency-dependent selection
The ancestral selection graph (ASG) was introduced by Neuhauser and Krone (1997) and Krone and Neuhauser
(1997) in order to study genealogies in the case of frequency-independent selection. Later, it was
extended in Neuhauser (1999) to a model of minority-advantage, a special form of frequency-
dependence in an infinite alleles setting.
Here, we introduce the ASG in order to give a proof of Theorem 1. For its construction,
consider again Figure 2. If a sample of individuals is drawn at the top of the figure, one can
read off all events which finally determine their types. Because there are three different kinds
of arrows, the history of the sample as well comes with three different events. First, T1-arrows
between lines in the sample lead to coalescence events, because common ancestors are found along
such events. Second, T2-arrows mostly origin from lines outside the sample. Since they as well are
determinants of the types in the sample, such events lead to branching events into a continuing
and an incoming branch. Third, T3-arrows lead to splits of a line into the continuing, the checking
and the imitating line.
This informal description turns into the following stochastic process: Starting with n lines, the
following transitions occur:
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1. Every pair of lines coalesces at rate 1.
2. Every single line splits in two (called the continuing and incoming line) at rate α|β|.
3. Every single line splits in three (called the continuing, checking and imitating line) at rate
α|γ|.
Consider again the graphical representation of the Moran model from Figure 2. Here, starting
with n lines at the top of the figure, it might be that the last event which hits one of the n lines is
a T2- or T3-arrow, which originates from one of the n lines. However, since N is assumed to be
large, and the N →∞ limit gives (2.1), this case can be ignored in the limit.
Once this graph is run for time t (i.e. from time t down to time 0), and the starting frequency
of type A (at time 0) of the forward process is given, we can determine the configuration of the
n lines. First, assign randomly each of the lines of the ASG at time 0 with A according to the
starting frequency. Then, go through the ASG from time 0 up to time t. The types are inherited
along every T1-arrow. Moreover, we have to distinguish the inheritance rules in the four cases,
(i)–(iv).
2A In cases (i) and (iii), i.e. when β > 0, the type of the incoming branch is inherited if it has
type A. Otherwise the type of the continuing branch is inherited.
2B In cases (ii) and (iv), i.e. when β < 0, the type of the incoming branch is inherited if it has
type B. Otherwise the type of the continuing branch is inherited.
3A In cases (i) and (iv), i.e. when γ > 0, the type of the imitating branch is inherited if it has
type B and the checking branch has type A. Otherwise the type of the continuing branch is
inherited.
3B In cases (ii) and (iii), i.e. when γ < 0, the type of the imitating branch is inherited if it has
type A and the checking branch has type A. Otherwise the type of the continuing branch is
inherited.
It is important to understand that these rules are reminiscent of the corresponding transitions in
the Moran model. As an example, consider Figure 3(D). (Here, the ASG is given starting with
a single line at the top, n = 1.) In case (i) and (iv), the type of the line at the top is A only if
both lines at the bottom have type A. If the first line is B, the continuing branch of the T3-event
is followed which carries type B. If the first line is A and the second line is B, rule 3A says that
the type of the imitating branch is inherited, hence the line at the top has type B. In case (ii)
and (iii), the line at the top is A if and only if the first line at the bottom is type A. In this case,
the imitating line can only be used if it has type A as well, leading to type A at the top. If the
first line carries B, the continuing line is used at the T3-event, leading to type B at the top. In
Table 1, we assume that the frequency of type A at time 0 is ε ≪ 1, and we give all possibilities
which lead to fixation of type A, which require at most one type-A individual in the past, and
theire respective probabilities up to order ε.
5 Two proofs of Theorem 1
5.1 A proof based on Rousset (2003) and Ladret and Lessard (2007)
Although the proof of Ladret and Lessard (2007), which is based on ideas from Rousset (2003)
is carried out in a time-discrete model, the same argument works for the SDE (2.1). Again, we
write Eε,α[.] for expectations with X0 = ε and fitness coefficient α. First, (2.1) is continuous in
the parameter α, such that Eε,α[f(Xt)] = Eε,0[f(Xt)](1 +O(α)) for f ∈ C
2
b (R). Moreover, by the
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(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
✻
past
present
c i c i c i c i
Figure 3: All different possible events/genealogies in the ancestral selection graph (ASG) connected
to (2.1). Time in the ASG is running from top to bottom, i.e. from the present to the past. (A)
In this case, when picking a single line in the present, its type only depends on the type of its
ancestor, which is the single line at the bottom. (B) A T2-arrow leads to a split of a single line into
a (straight) continuing line and an incoming line. In case (i) (case (ii)), if the incoming line has
type A (type B), the type at the top is type A (type B) as well. If the incoming line has type B
(type A), the type at the top equals the type of the continuing line. Here, the type of the line in
the present depends on the types of both lines at the bottom. (C) A T3-arrow leads to a split of
a single line in the checking (c), imitating (i) and continuing line. Here, in case (i) (case (ii)), if
the checking line is type A (in both cases), and the imitating branch is type B (type A), the type
at the top is type B (type A) as well. In all other cases, the type at the top equals the type of the
continuing line. (D), (E), (F) In addition to a T3-branching event, coalescence of two lines might
happen, leading to two lines present in the ASG at the bottom of the time window.
Genealogy G = g
c i c i c i c i
Case (i): in which cases does A fix? • • or •
c i
•
c i c i
•
c i
•
Case (i): P[A fixes| G = g,X0 = ε] ε 2ε ε 0 ε ε
Case (ii): in which cases does A fix? •
c i
•
c i
•
c i
•
c i
• or
c i
•
Case (ii): P[A fixes| G = g,X0 = ε] ε 0 ε ε ε 2ε
Case (iii): in which cases does A fix? • • or •
c i
•
c i
•
c i
•
c i
• or
c i
•
Case (iii): P[A fixes| G = g,X0 = ε] ε 2ε ε ε ε 2ε
Case (iv): in which cases does A fix? •
c i
•
c i c i
•
c i
•
Case (iv): P[A fixes| G = g,X0 = ε] ε 0 ε 0 ε ε
Table 1: All possible genealogies close to time 0 in the ASG for small selection strength α and a
small starting frequency X0 = ε≪ 1. In the second (fourth, sixth, eighth) line we indicate which
of the lines at the bottom has to be type A such that type A fixes in case (i) (case (ii), case (iii),
case (iv)). In the third (fifth, seventh, ninth) line we give the corresponding probabilities (with
error terms of order ε2).
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duality of the Wright–Fisher diffusion, i.e. (2.1) with α = 0, to Kingman’s coalescent,
Eε,0[Xt(1−Xt)] = e
−tε(1− ε) = e−t
(
ε+O(ε2)
)
,
Eε,0[X
2
t (1−Xt)] = e
−3tε2(1− ε) +
∫ t
0
3e−3se−(t−s)
1
3
ε(1− ε)ds
=
1
2
e−t(1 − e−2t)
(
ε+O(ε2)
)
as ε→ 0. Here, the first equation arises since 2Xt(1−Xt) is the probability to obtain two different
types when picking from the population. This event requires that the two sampled individuals
do not share an ancestor between times 0 and t. Moreover, both ancestors have to have different
types. For the second equality, when sampling three individuals, two of which are type A, there
are two possibilities. Either no coalescence of the three sampled lines occurred between times 0
and t, or two of three lines coalesced and have a type A-ancestor. Combining these results,
Pε,α(A fixes) = Eε,α[X∞] = ε+
∫ ∞
0
d
dt
Eε,α[Xt]dt
= ε+ α
∫ ∞
0
Eε,0[Xt(1 −Xt)(β − γXt)](1 +O(α))dt
= ε+ α
∫ ∞
0
(
βe−t
(
ε+O(ε2)
)
−
1
2
γe−t(1− e−2t)
(
ε+O(ε2)
))
(1 +O(α))dt
= ε
(
1 + α
(
β − γ
1
3
))
+O(α2, ε2),
which finishes the first proof.
5.2 A proof based on the ASG
Let us prove Theorem 1 by using the ASG. Here, type A eventually fixes if and only if the common
ancestor of all individuals carries type A. Therefore, we have to study the ASG which has run for
an infinite amount of time (i.e. from time infinity back to time 0). Since α is assumed to be small,
we can assume that the ASG has only a single line at time 0 with high probability. However, with
probability of order α, the ASG has split close to time 0 but the resulting lines have not fully
coalesced yet. Since α is small, we can assume that the last split event happened when the ASG
only had a single line.
In Figure 3, we list all possible ASGs near time 0 which we have to consider. Start with case
(B), which is a split in two lines. We abbreviate this genealogy by . Noting that such split events
occur at rate α|β|, and coalescence of the resulting two lines happens at rate 1, the probability for
this case is (by competing exponential clocks)
P
( )
=
α|β|
1 + α|β|
+O(α2) = α|β|+O(α2). (5.1)
Similarly, consider the case when the last split occurs into three lines, which do not coalesce up
to time 0 (case
c i
). Since coalescence of any pair happens at rate 3, we obtain
P
(
c i
)
=
α|γ|
3 + α|γ|
+O(α2) =
α|γ|
3
+O(α2). (5.2)
Finally, the last split can lead to three lines and two of them coalesce up to time 0. Since all three
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possible genealogies (denoted
c i
,
c i
and
c i
) have equal probability, we obtain
P
(
c i
)
= P
(
c i
)
= P
(
c i
)
=
1
3
α|γ|
1 + α|γ|
+O(α2) =
α|γ|
3
+O(α2). (5.3)
Last, we have for the remaining case
P
( )
= 1−P
( )
−P
(
c i
)
−P
(
c i
)
−P
(
c i
)
−P
(
c i
)
+O(α2)
= 1− α
(
|β|+
4
3
|γ|
)
+O(α2).
(5.4)
Using Table 1 for the probabilities of fixation conditioned on the genealogy, we can now collect all
terms in the four cases. We obtain
Case (i): pfix(ε, α) = ε ·P
( )
+ 2ε ·P
( )
+ ε ·P
(
c i
)
+ ε ·P
(
c i
)
+ ε ·P
(
c i
)
+O(α2, ε2)
Case (ii): pfix(ε, α) = ε ·P
( )
+ ε ·P
(
c i
)
+ ε ·P
(
c i
)
+ ε ·P
(
c i
)
+ 2ε ·P
(
c i
)
+O(α2, ε2)
Case (iii): pfix(ε, α) = ε ·P
( )
+ 2ε ·P
( )
+ ε ·P
(
c i
)
+ ε ·P
(
c i
)
+ ε ·P
(
c i
)
+ 2ε ·P
(
c i
)
+O(α2, ε2)
Case (iv): pfix(ε, α) = ε ·P
( )
+ ε ·P
(
c i
)
+ ε ·P
(
c i
)
+ ε ·P
(
c i
)
+O(α2, ε2)
Plugging in the probabilities from (5.1), (5.2), (5.3) and (5.4), we obtain in all cases
pfix(ε, α) = ε
(
1 + α
(
β − γ
1
3
))
+O(α2, ε2) (5.5)
which finishes the second proof of Theorem 1.
6 Proof of Theorem 2
The proof is based on the graphical construction of the Moran model; see Figure 2. We have to
take into account all three different kinds of arrows. Let R12 = R12(t) be the random distance of
two individuals taken at random from the Moran model at time t. In addition, Z3 = Z3(t) and
Z4 = Z4(t) are the types of two additionally sampled individuals. We claim that in case (i)
d
dt
EN,α[e
−λR12 ] = −λEN,α[e
−λR12 ] + 1−EN,α[e
−λR12 ]
+ α|β| · EN,α[1Z3=A(e
−λR23 − e−λR12)]
+ α|γ| ·EN,α[1Z3=B1Z4=A(e
−λR23 − e−λR12)] +O(1/N).
(6.1)
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Here, the first term describes the increase of the genealogical distance of individuals 1 and 2 if no
events occur. Second, T1-arrows between 1 and 2 lead to R12 = 0 (hence e
−λR12 = 1) at rate 1.
Third, the origin of T2-arrows is with high probability (1−O(1/N)) neither individual 1 nor 2, but
a third individual, with type Z3. However, this arrow only takes effect if Z3 = A. Last, T3-arrows
again originate from a third individual with type Z3. It picks a fourth individual with type Z4 and
if Z3 = B and Z4 = A, the arrow takes effect. All terms require that the two/three/four chosen
individuals are distinct; hence the error term O(1/N).
Our goal is to approximate the right hand side of (6.1). We note that the ASG implies that
for all expectations on the right hand side we have that EN,α[.] = EN,0[.] +O(α) for small α and
large N . Hence, we can use EN,0[.] as an approximation which is valid up to order α.
Recall that the mutation rate from A to B is θB/2 and from B to A is θA/2, as well as
θ¯ := θA + θB. We note that for N → ∞, we can use Kingman’s coalescent, since it is known to
give genealogies in the large population limit of the neutral Moran model. We write E[.] for the
expectation when using Kingman’s coalescent and finally argue that EN,0[.] = E[.] +O(1/N). We
obtain
E[1Z1=B1Z2=A] =
θB/2
1 + θ¯
·
θA
θ¯
+
θA/2
1 + θ¯
·
θB
θ¯
=
θAθB
θ¯
1
1 + θ¯
,
E[1Z1=Ae
−λR12 ] = E[1Z3=Ae
−λR12 ] =
θA
θ¯
1
1 + λ
,
E[1Z1=Be
−λR12 ] = E[1Z3=Be
−λR12 ] =
θB
θ¯
1
1 + λ
.
Here, the first equality holds since Z1 = B and Z2 = A if and only if the first mutation event
occurs before the two sampled lines coalesce. This mutation event must either be B → A in
individual 1 or B → A in individual 2. Using similar arguments, we obtain
E[1Z1=A1Z2=Be
−λR12 ] =
∫ ∞
0
(1 + θ¯)e−(1+θ¯)t ·
(1 + θA/2 + θB/2
1 + θ¯
· 0
+
θA/2
1 + θ¯
E[1Z2=Be
−λ(t+R12)] +
θB/2
1 + θ¯
E[1Z1=Ae
−λ(t+R12)]
)
dt
=
θAθB
θ¯
1
(1 + θ¯ + λ)(1 + λ)
,
E[1Z2=B1Z3=Ae
−λR12 ] =
∫ ∞
0
(3 + θ¯)e−(3+θ¯)t
·
( 1
3 + θ¯
E[1Z1=A1Z2=Be
−λ(t+R12)] +
1
3 + θ¯
E[1Z2=A1Z3=Be
−λt]
+
θA/2
3 + θ¯
E[1Z1=Be
−λ(t+R12)] +
θB/2
3 + θ¯
E[1Z3=Ae
−λ(t+R12)]
)
dt
=
θAθB
θ¯
1
3 + θ¯ + λ
( 1
(1 + θ¯ + λ)(1 + λ)
+
1
1 + θ¯
+
1
1 + λ
)
=
θAθB
θ¯
(2 + θ¯ + λ
3 + θ¯ + λ
1
(1 + θ¯ + λ)(1 + λ)
+
1
(3 + θ¯ + λ)(θ¯ + 1)
)
,
E[1Z2=A1Z3=Be
−λR12 ] = E[1Z2=B1Z3=Ae
−λR12 ],
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E[1Z3=B1Z4=Ae
−λR12 ] =
∫ ∞
0
(6 + θ¯)e−(6+θ¯)t
·
( 1
6 + θ¯
E[1Z3=B1Z4=Ae
−λt] +
4
6 + θ¯
E[1Z2=A1Z3=Be
−λ(t+R12)]
+
θA/2
6 + θ¯
E[1Z3=Be
−λ(t+R12)] +
θB/2
6 + θ¯
E[1Z3=Ae
−λ(t+R12)]
)
dt
=
θAθB
θ¯
1
6 + θ¯ + λ
( 1
1 + θ¯
+
2 + θ¯ + λ
3 + θ¯ + λ
4
(1 + θ¯ + λ)(1 + λ)
+
4
(3 + θ¯ + λ)(1 + θ¯)
+
1
1 + λ
)
=
θAθB
θ¯
(7 + θ¯ + λ
6 + θ¯ + λ
1
(3 + θ¯ + λ)(1 + θ¯)
+
2 + θ¯ + λ
3 + θ¯ + λ
5 + θ¯ + λ
6 + θ¯ + λ
1
(1 + θ¯ + λ)(1 + λ)
+
1
(6 + θ¯ + λ)(3 + θ¯ + λ)(1 + λ)
)
Plugging the last two terms in (6.1) we find that in equilibrium
EN,α[e
−λR12 ] =
1
1 + λ
+
α|γ|
1 + λ
EN,0[1Z2=A1Z3=Be
−λR12 − 1Z3=A1Z4=Be
−λR12 ] +O(α2)
=
1
1 + λ
+
α|γ|
1 + λ
θAθB
θ¯
1
6 + θ¯ + λ
(2 + θ¯ + λ
3 + θ¯ + λ
1
(1 + θ¯ + λ)(1 + λ)
−
1
(3 + θ¯ + λ)(1 + θ¯)
−
1
(3 + θ¯ + λ)(1 + λ)
)
+O(α2)
=
1
1 + λ
+
α|γ|
1 + λ
θAθB
θ¯
1
6 + θ¯ + λ
2 + θ¯ + λ
3 + θ¯ + λ
( 1
(1 + θ¯ + λ)(1 + λ)
−
1
(1 + θ¯)(1 + λ)
)
+O(α2)
=
1
1 + λ
− α|γ|
θAθB
θ¯
(2 + θ¯ + λ)λ
(6 + θ¯ + λ)(3 + θ¯ + λ)(1 + θ¯ + λ)(1 + θ¯)(1 + λ)2
+O(α2).
In particular, using a derivative according to λ at λ = 0,
EN,α[R12] = −
∂
∂λ
EN,α[e
−λR12 ]
∣∣∣
λ=0
= 1 + α|γ|
θAθB
θ¯
2 + θ¯
(6 + θ¯)(3 + θ¯)(1 + θ¯)2
+O(α2)
In case (ii), (6.1) changes to
d
dt
EN,α[e
−λR12 ] = −λEN,α[e
−λR12 ] + 1−EN,α[e
−λR12 ] + α|β|EN,α[1Z3=B(e
−λR12 − e−λR23)]
+ α|γ|EN,α[1Z3=A1Z4=A(e
−λR23 − e−λR12)] +O(1/N).
As above, the term behind α|β| vanishes. Moreover,
EN,α[1Z2=A1Z3=Ae
−λR12 ] = EN,α[1Z2=Ae
−λR12 ]−EN,α[1Z2=A1Z3=Be
−λR12 ],
EN,α[1Z3=A1Z4=Ae
−λR12 ] = EN,α[1Z4=Ae
−λR12 ]−EN,α[1Z3=B1Z4=Ae
−λR12 ].
Therefore, in equilibrium,
EN,α[e
−λR12 ] =
1
1 + λ
+
α|γ|
1 + λ
EN,0[1Z2=A1Z3=Ae
−λR12 − 1Z3=A1Z4=Ae
−λR12 ] +O(α2, 1/N)
=
1
1 + λ
−
α|γ|
1 + λ
EN,0[1Z2=A1Z3=Be
−λR12 − 1Z3=A1Z4=Be
−λR12 ] +O(α2, 1/N).
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Using the result from case (i), we are done with case (ii). Cases (iii) and (iv) are similar, because
the term behind α|β| vanishes. This finishes the proof.
References
Berestycki, N. (2009). Recent progress in coalescent theory. Sociedade Brasileira de Matema´tica,
Ensaios Matema´ticos 16, 1–193.
Depperschmidt, A., A. Greven, and P. Pfaffelhuber (2012). Tree-valued Fleming-Viot dynamics
with mutation and selection. Ann. Appl. Probab. to appear.
Ethier, S. and T. Kurtz (1993). Fleming-Viot processes in population genetics. SIAM J. Contr.
Optim. 31, 345–386.
Ewens, W. (2004). Mathematical Population Genetics. I. Theoretical Introduction (2nd ed.).
Springer.
Gokhale, C. S. and A. Traulsen (2011). Strategy abundance in evolutionary many-player games
with multiple strategies. J. Theor. Biol. 283 (1), 180–191.
Greven, A., P. Pfaffelhuber, and A. Winter (2012). Tree-valued resampling dynamics (martingale
problems and applications). Prob. Theo. Rel. Fields to appear.
Imhof, L. A. and M. A. Nowak (2006). Evolutionary game dynamics in a wright-fisher process. J.
Math. Biol. 52 (5), 667–681.
Karlin, S. and H. M. Taylor (1981). A second course in stochastic processes. Academic Press
London.
Kingman, J. F. C. (1982). The coalescent. Stochastic Process. Appl. 13 (3), 235–248.
Krone, S. and C. Neuhauser (1997). Ancestral processes with selection. Theo. Pop. Biol. 51,
210–237.
Ladret, V. and S. Lessard (2007). Fixation probability for a beneficial allele and a mutant strategy
in a linear game under weak selection in a finite island model. Theor. Popul. Biol. 72 (3), 409–
425.
Lessard, S. and V. Ladret (2007). The probability of fixation of a single mutant in an exchangeable
selection model. J. Math. Biol. 54 (5), 721–744.
Maynard-Smith, J. (1982). Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge University Press.
Neuhauser, C. (1999). The ancestral graph and gene genealogy under frequency-dependent selec-
tion. Theor. Popul. Biol. 56 (2), 203–214.
Neuhauser, C. and S. Krone (1997). The genealogy of samples in models with selection. Genet-
ics 154, 519–534.
Nowak, M. (2006). Evolutionary Dynamics: Exploring the Equations of Life. Harvard University
Press.
Nowak, M. A., A. Sasaki, C. Taylor, and D. Fudenberg (2004). Emergence of cooperation and
evolutionary stability in finite populations. Nature 428 (6983), 646–650.
Ohtsuki, H., P. Bordalo, and M. A. Nowak (2007). The one-third law of evolutionary dynamics.
J. Theor. Biol. 249 (2), 289–295.
Rousset, F. (2003). A minimal derivation of convergence stability measures. J. Theor. Biol. 221 (4),
665–668.
REFERENCES 14
Rousset, F. (2004). Genetic Structure and Selection in Subdivided Populations. Princeton Univer-
sity Press.
Taylor, P. D. and L. B. Jonker (1978). Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics. Math.
Biosci. 40, 145–156.
Traulsen, A., J. M. Pacheco, and L. A. Imhof (2006). Stochasticity and evolutionary stability.
Phys. Rev. E Stat. Nonlin. Soft Matter Phys. 74 (2 Pt 1), 021905–021905.
Wu, B., P. M. Altrock, L. Wang, and A. Traulsen (2010). Universality of weak selection. Phys.
Rev. E Stat. Nonlin. Soft Matter Phys. 82 (4 Pt 2), 046106–046106.
